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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ] 
vs. ) 
KIM BEDDOES, ) 
Defendant/Appellant. ) 
l APPELLANT'S 
) OPENING BRIEF 
i Case No. 930800-CA 
i Priority No. 2 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction for Possession of Marijuana with Intent 
to Distribute, a third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8 (1992). This 
Court obtains jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) 
(1993). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial court erroneously rejected defendant's claim that, as a matter 
of law, he was entrapped into committing the crime of possessing marijuana with intent to 
distribute. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Defendant first challenges the trial court's rejection of his claim that he was 
entrapped, as a matter of law. We must therefore determine whether the trial 
court properly identified and interpreted the law regarding entrapment when it 
ruled that the law did not require a finding that he was entrapped. This clearly 
presents a question of law. . . . "When a challenge to a trial court's decision 
concerns a question of law, we accord no particular deference, but review for 
correctness." State v. Duncan, 812 P.2d 60, 62 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 826 
P.2d 651 (Utah 1991). 
State v. Gallegos, 849 P.2d 586, 588 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303 (1992): 
(1) It is a defense that the actor was entrapped into committing the 
offense. Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement officer or a person directed 
by or acting in cooperation with the officer induces the commission of an offense 
in order to obtain evidence of the commission for prosecution by methods 
creating a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by one not 
otherwise ready to commit it. Conduct merely affording a person an opportunity 
to commit an offense does not constitute entrapment. 
(2) The defense of entrapment shall be unavailable when causing or 
threatening bodily injury is an element of the offense charged and the prosecution 
is based on conduct causing or threatening the injury to a person other than the 
person perpetrating the entrapment. 
(3) The defense provided by this section is available even though the 
actor denies commission of the conduct charged to constitute the offense. 
(4) Upon written motion of the defendant, the court shall hear evidence 
on the issue and shall determine as a matter of fact and law whether the defendant 
was entrapped to commit the offense. Defendant's motion shall be made at least 
ten days before trial except the court for good cause shown may permit a later 
filing. 
(5) Should the court determine that the defendant was entrapped, it 
shall dismiss the case with prejudice, but if the court determines the defendant 
was not entrapped, such issue may be presented by the defendant to the jury at 
trial. Any order by the court dismissing a case based on entrapment shall be 
appealable by the state. 
- 2 -
(6) In any hearing before a judge or jury where the defense of 
entrapment is an issue, past offenses of the defendant shall not be admitted except 
that in a trial where the defendant testifies he may be asked of his past 
convictions for felonies and any testimony given by the defendant and a hearing 
on entrapment may be used to impeach his testimony at trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendant Kim Beddoes ("Beddoes") was charged by Information with Possession of 
Marijuana with Intent to Distribute, a third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 58-37-8(l)(a)(iv) (1992) (R.8). 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDING 
Beddoes filed several pre-trial motions, including a motion to dismiss, asserting he was 
entrapped into committing the alleged crime as a matter of law (R.33 & id.- 57). See Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-2-303 (1992). After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted in part and denied 
in part some of the pretrial motions (R. 130; R.380-382; Addendum B). The motion to dismiss 
on entrapment grounds was initially denied (R.130), but was thereafter taken under advisement 
(R.153; R.584), and eventually denied after a jury trial (R.585). 
C. DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT 
On September 27, 1993, the jury found Beddoes guilty as charged (R.582). The court 
subsequently sentenced Beddoes to zero to five years in Utah State Prison and imposed a fine 
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of $1,000.00. The prison term was suspended in lieu of a thirty-six month probation (R.211; 
Addendum C). A notice of appeal was timely filed on December 10, 1993 (R.213). 
D. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
On November 13, 1992, Ned Shepherd, a self-proclaimed drug dealer, was travelling 
from California to Utah armed with a shipment of illicit substances, to wit, marijuana (R.303, 
311). While traveling through Juab County, Shepherd was stopped by Sergeant Paul Mangelson 
of the Utah Highway Patrol (R.304; R.406).2 A search of Shepherd's vehicle revealed fifteen 
pounds of marijuana (R.227; R.305; R.406). 
At home in Nephi, Utah, chopping woods after a hard day and night of work at the 
cement plant was Kim Beddoes (R.329; R.514-516), a known drug user (R.427, 517). Shepherd 
and Beddoes have been friends for more than twenty years, since their high school days (R.512-
513). Beddoes was unaware that his good friend Shepherd was endeavoring to traverse the 
highways on November 13 with a load of illicit substances (R.315; R.418). 
Discovered also during the search of Shepherd's person was a "piece of paper" (R.227). 
Several names and phone numbers of Shepherd's friends and relatives were on this piece of 
paper (R.277-228; R.419). Unfortunately for Beddoes, his name and phone number were on 
1
 Beddoes assert that he was entrapped into committing the alleged crime, and thus this 
case is highly fact sensitive. State v. Richardson, 843 P.2d 517, 517 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
2
 See State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141, 142 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (describing Sergeant 
Mangelson's vigilance in apprehending drug traffickers). 
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the piece of paper (R.227). The arresting officers immediately recognized Beddoes' name as 
a possible drug user and/or trafficker. At this point, surmising that Beddoes was a "public 
nuisance" who deserved to be busted (R.311), the officers decided not to pursue Shepherd but 
to go after Beddoes. In essence, in a rather perverted way of fighting the war on drugs, the 
officers chose to release a big fish into the ocean with the hope of catching a small one (R.423-
424); see Williamson v. United States, _ U.S. _ , 62 U.S.L.W. 4639, 4642 (June 27, 1994) 
(attached as Addendum D). The stage was thus set for a deal in which Shepherd would waylay 
an unwary Beddoes. To ensure the success of the deal, the State made Shepherd a lucrative 
offer that not many reasonable human beings would refuse: His felony charges would be reduced 
to a misdemeanor and no forfeiture and/or drug stamp tax prosecutions would follow3 if 
Shepherd agreed to make a controlled delivery of marijuana to the residence of his best friend 
of twenty years (R.230, 276-278; R.312-313). Shepherd accepted the deal, albeit, he claimed, 
reluctantly (R.314), apparently because he felt guilty about entrapping his friend (R.546). 
With Bill Thompkins, a Juab County deputy sheriff, Don Ellis, a sergeant with the Utah 
Department of Public Safety, and Andre Leavitt of the Utah County Narcotics Task Force, 
directing (R.308; R.423-424), a plan was devised for Shepherd to call Beddoes' home and then 
deliver to him about twenty-three ounces or a pound of marijuana (R.314; R.407, 468). Prior 
3
 See Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-13 (1992) (forfeiture of instrumentalities used in 
transporting controlled substances) and 59-19-101 (1992) (penalties for failure to purchase Illegal 
Drug Stamp Tax). 
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to November 13, Shepherd normally sold about four ounces of marijuana to Beddoes (R.311-
312, 320).4 
After several abortive tries (R.329), Shepherd contacted Beddoes at home over the phone, 
stating briefly that he was coming to the Beddoes residence (R.316). There was no discussion 
about drugs (R.280). When Shepherd entered Beddoes' residence, according to the electronic 
device monitoring Shepherd's movement and conversation, the two exchanged greetings and 
Shepherd handed twenty-three ounces of marijuana to Beddoes. He advised Beddoes that the 
cost of the marijuana was $1,600.00 in addition to $450.00 previously owed on a prior supply 
(R.231; R.319-320; R.411). Because of the unusually large quantity of marijuana brought to 
him this time (R.544), Beddoes was rather "surprised" (R.427) and thus refused to accept 
delivery, claiming he had no money (R.517). 
The illicit nature of the drug trade and lack of trust amongst traders require that the 
enterprise be conducted strictly on cash basis. "Fronting" or credit extension, though not 
uncommon, is viewed disfavorably. Even when fronting is absolutely necessary, for example, 
when the buyer's bad habit has to be supported during withdrawal, the seller would only front 
controlled substances once but never twice (R.549). Although the plan in this case was not 
perfectly designed since Beddoes had no money to pay for the drugs, Shepherd had to improvise 
rather swiftly in order to consummate the transaction at any cost and obtain the benefits of his 
4
 Accordingly, as further described below, Beddoes was "surprised" by the amount of 
marijuana "fronted" him on the 13th by Shepherd (R.427). 
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deal with the State. To that end, Shepherd made a rather "extremely unusual" move by 
"fronting" one pound of marijuana to Beddoes, without having collected the $450.00 Beddoes 
owed him on the previous supply (R.549). Unbeknownst to him that Shepherd was working 
surreptitiously for the government and believing he was getting a pretty good deal, Beddoes 
accepted the fronted marijuana, without payment (R.411-12). 
Shortly thereafter, the police executed a search warrant at Beddoes' residence (R.231-
232).5 Beddoes was located in the bathroom attempting to flush the marijuana down the toilet. 
He was apprehended and arrested for possessing marijuana with intent to distribute (R.233). 
Thereafter, Beddoes filed a motion to dismiss, asserting he was entrapped into 
committing the alleged crime as a matter of law (R.33 & id. at 57). After an evidentiary 
hearing, the motion to dismiss on entrapment grounds was taken under advisement (R.153; 
R.584), and eventually denied after a jury trial (R.585). 
The jury found Beddoes guilty as charged (R.582). Subsequently, the court sentenced 
Beddoes to zero to five years in Utah State Prison and imposed a fine of $1,000.00. The prison 
term was suspended in lieu of a thirty-six month probation (R.211). This appeal then followed 
(R.213). 
5
 A warrant to search Beddoes' residence was obtained while the controlled delivery was 
being hatched (R.450). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Because the district court made no findings of fact on Beddoes' entrapment claim, this 
Court lacks the necessary tool for meaningful appellate review. Accordingly, this case should 
be remanded for the trial court for factual findings and conclusions of law. In the event this 
Court finds the record sufficient for review, Beddoes urges this Court to conclude that he was 
entrapped into committing the crime of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute when 
the State literally gave him twenty-three ounces of marijuana without requiring him to pay for 
the substances on the spot. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
LACK OF FACTUAL FINDINGS BY THE TRIAL COURT ON BEDDOES' 
MOTION TO DISMISS CHARGES ON ENTRAPMENT GROUNDS 
REQUIRES A REMAND. 
This Court has often stated that entrapment cases are highly factual in nature. See State 
v. Wright, 744 P.2d 315, 316 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Accordingly, when there is conflicting 
evidence presented to the court at an evidentiary hearing on a motion to dismiss on entrapment 
grounds the trial court is obligated to assess the witnesses' credibility and make factual findings. 
See State v. Castas, 567 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1977). Accord, State v. Richardson, 843 P.2d 
517, 518 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Because it is difficult, if not impossible, to discern which 
version of the evidence the jury eventually adopts in rejecting an entrapment defense, trial courts 
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should be required to make factual findings whether or not the defense is also presented to a 
jury.6 See Utah R. Crim. P. 12(c) ("Where factual issues are involved in determining a motion, 
the court shall state its findings on the record."); State v. Genovesi, 871 P.2d 547, 549-50 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994); State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880 (Utah Ct. App), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 
(Utah 1990). 
Apart from Rule 12(c) mandate, the entrapment statute requiring the trial court to 
"determine as a matter of fact and law whether the defendant was entrapped to commit the 
offense,"7 was obviously intended to have the court make factual findings and conclusions of 
law independent of the jury. Section 76-2-303(4) does not contemplate the trial court delegating 
to the jury an important, statutorily imposed duty. Moreover, a rule requiring the trial court to 
make entrapment findings independent of the jury fulfills another important ambition: it provides 
appellate court and counsel meaningful avenue for resolving critical legal issues. See Genovesi, 
871 P.2d at 550; State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767, 771 n. 11 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).8 
6
 Compare State v. Martinez, 848 P.2d 702 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (entrapment defense 
renewed before jury upon trial court denial of motion to dismiss) with Richardson, 843 P.2d at 
517 (defendant entering conditional guilty plea upon trial court denial of motion to dismiss on 
entrapment grounds). 
7
 Utah Code Ann. §76-2-303(4) (1992). 
8
 This purpose is particularly more central in cases where, after the trial court denies a 
motion to dismiss on entrapment grounds, the defendant opted to enter a conditional plea to the 
charges. E.g., Richardson, 843 P.2d at 517. 
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In this case, the district court recognized not only that Beddoes had come forward with 
prima facie entrapment evidence, but also that the facts of the case are rather close and thus 
reasonable "minds may differ" as to whether Beddoes was entrapped as a matter of law. See 
R. 585; Addendum A. However, the court made no factual findings on entrapment; nor did the 
court eventually conclude that defendant was not entrapped as a matter of law. Rather, the court 
simply decided to "leave [the issue] up to the jury." Id. The trial court should not be allowed 
to pass the buck on the critical legal question of whether the government entrapped a citizen into 
committing a crime s/he would have otherwise committed. Accordingly, this case should be 
remanded for the district court to make adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law on 
entrapment. The following argument is presented in the alternative were this Court to find 
something to review in the district court's cursory denial of Beddoes' motion to dismiss. 
POINT n 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Defendant first challenges the trial court's rejection of his claim that he was 
entrapped, as a matter of law. We must therefore determine whether the trial 
court properly identified and interpreted the law regarding entrapment when it 
ruled that the law did not require a finding that he was entrapped. This clearly 
presents a question of law. . . . "When a challenge to a trial court's decision 
concerns a question of law, we accord no particular deference, but review for 
correctness." State v. Duncan, 812 P.2d 60, 62 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 826 
P.2d 651 (Utah 1991). 
State v. Gallegos, 849 P.2d 586, 588 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
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B. BEDDOES WAS ENTRAPPED AS A MATTER OF LAW 
Even considered in the light most favorable to the guilty verdict, State v. Moore, 782 
P.2d 497, 501 (Utah 1989),9 the evidence shows that, on November 13, 1992, Shepherd was 
pulled over for speeding. The police discovered fifteen pounds of marijuana in his vehicle. 
They also found a piece of paper containing names and phone numbers in his wallet. Beddoes' 
phone number was on the list. Beddoes and Shepherd have been friends for over twenty years 
and the former had purchased marijuana in the past from the latter. In fact, Beddoes owed 
Shepherd $450.00 from a previous drug supply. However, Beddoes was unaware that Shepherd 
was bringing marijuana to Utah that day. Subsequently, the police made a deal with Shepherd 
to supply twenty-three ounces of marijuana to Beddoes under controlled circumstances. In 
exchange, he was assured that his felony charges would be reduced to a misdemeanor and no 
civil proceedings would be instituted. Thereafter, Shepherd went to Beddoes's residence and 
told Beddoes the price was $1,600.00 for the marijuana and reminded Beddoes he still owed 
$450.00 on a previous supply. Shepherd was paid neither $1,600.00 nor $450.00. Rather, he 
"fronted" the marijuana to Beddoes, even though he had never before fronted him marijuana 
twice without collecting on the previous debt. In addition, Shepherd had never supplied such 
a large quantity of marijuana to Beddoes before. See R.406, 412-418, 419-427, 512, 517-518. 
9
 Beddoes reiterates that the trial court should have made findings of fact pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-2-303(4) and Utah R. Crim. P. 12(c). 
- 11 -
In this case of first impression this Court is called upon to determine whether the police 
entrapped Beddoes into committing the crime of possessing marijuana with intent to distribute 
by furnishing him marijuana for free. Section 76-2-303(1) provides: 
It is a defense that the actor was entrapped into committing the offense. 
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement officer or a person directed by or 
acting in cooperation with the officer induces the commission of an offense in 
order to obtain evidence of the commission for prosecution by methods creating 
a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by one not otherwise ready 
to commit it. Conduct merely affording a person to commit an offense does not 
constitute entrapment. 
In State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496 (Utah 1979), the supreme court determined that section 76-2-
303(1) had adopted the objective standard for determining entrapment. Under this standard, "the 
focus is not on the propensities and predisposition of the specific defendant, but on whether the 
police conduct revealed in the particular case falls below standards, to which common feelings 
respond, for the proper use of governmental power." Id. at 500; accord, Martinez, 848 P.2d 
at 707. The court goes on to state: 
In assessing police conduct under the objective standard, the test to determine an 
unlawful entrapment is whether a law enforcement official or an agent, in order 
to obtain evidence of the commission of the offense, induced the defendant to 
commit such an offense by persuasion or inducement which would be effective 
to persuade an average person, other than one who was merely given the 
opportunity to commit the offense. 
Extreme pleas of desperate illness or appeals based primarily on sympathy, pity, 
or close personal friendship, or offers of inordinate sums of money, are 
examples, depending on an evaluation of the circumstances in each case, of what 
might constitute prohibited police conduct. In evaluating the course of conduct 
between the government representative and the defendant, the transactions leading 
up to the offense, the interaction between the agent and the defendant, and the 
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response to the inducements of the agent, are all to be considered in judging what 
the effect of the governmentaTs agent conduct would be on a normal person. 
Taylor, 599 P.2d at 503 (footnote omitted). 
When, as here, at police insistence, a friend of more than twenty years in essence offered 
another friend twenty-three ounces of marijuana in exchange for nothing, Taylor instructs that 
the State has crossed the line between permissive police conduct and lawlessness, if it attempts 
to prosecute the latter for violating the law. See Taylor, 599 P.2d at 501, 504. This clearly is 
not a case involving "mere existence of a personal relationship [insufficient to] establish 
entrapment." Martinez, 848 P.2d at 707. Here, there was personal relationship plus more: had 
Shepherd insisted, as he normally does, that Beddoes pay him the $450.00 owing, Beddoes 
would certainly not have taken possession of the marijuana because he had no money to pay for 
it. In short, the fronting of the marijuana in this case is tantamount to inducement coerced by 
"offers of inordinate sums of money," which Taylor strongly condemned. See Taylor, 599 P.2d 
at 503. In other words, that Beddoes was given, rather than made to pay for, twenty-three 
ounces of marijuana, created a "substantial risk that the offense would be committed by one not 
otherwise ready to commit." Id. at 504. 
Although every entrapment case arguably is sui generis, Martinez, 848 P.2d at 706, this 
case typifies how the State employs "immoral and unethical tactics" in combatting "the war on 
drugs." State v. heVasseur, 854 P.2d 1022, 1025 n.l (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 862 P.2d 
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1356 (Utah 1993).10 Beddoes, who was not expecting any shipment of marijuana, was actually 
given the illegal substance for free, so that the State could obtain evidence of a crime. In 
essence, the prosecuting arm of the State manufactured a crime and then seeks the judiciary's 
ratification of its lawlessness. This Court should not countenance such a perverted use of 
governmental power. Cf. State v. Colonna, 766 P.2d 1062, 1065 (Utah 1988) (leaving open 
question whether police manufacture of a crime could violate defendant's due process rights). 
Thus, sound public policy is undoubtedly advanced by a court-fashioned prophylactic rule 
prohibiting the State from entangling itself in illicit drug trade. 
Utah appellate courts have not dealt with the issue of police providing illicit substances 
to citizens and then prosecuting them for possessing narcotics with intent to distribute. But 
M[c]ourts from other jurisdictions have taken a dim view of this police conduct." State v. 
Kummer, 481 N.W.2d 437, 441 (N.D. 1992) (citing numerous cases). See generally Comment, 
Criminal Procedure: Entrapment Rationale Employed to Condemn Government's Furnishings of 
Contraband, 59 Minn.L.Rev. 444 (1974). These courts have applied -- and justifiably so - the 
per se rule that, without more, police conduct of furnishing controlled substances to citizens in 
an attempt to ferret out criminals establishes entrapment as matter of law. See, e.g., United 
States v. West, 511 F.2d 1083, 1085 (3d Cir. 1975). 
10
 Cf. Williamson, 62 U.S.L.W. at 4642 (describing the antithesis of this case: how small 
time drug dealers and users normally help the police catch big time dealers). See generally 
Note, Crossing the Constitutional Line: Due Process and the Law Enforcement Justification, 67 
Notre Dame L.Rev. 745, 795-97 (1992). 
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The per se rule, indeed, has attracted a larger audience in jurisdictions, like Utah, 
employing the objective entrapment standard, see Evans v. State, 550 P.2d 830, 844-45 (Alaska 
1976), precisely because it seeks to deter improper law enforcement techniques, consistent with 
the age-old rationale for the entrapment defense. Kummer, 481 NW.2d at 443. A rationale for 
the per se rule is explained thus: 
Frequently, it is permissible law enforcement practice for an undercover agent to 
obtain evidence of unlawful traffic in narcotics by purchasing heroin from a 
suspected peddler. But when the government's own agent has set the accused up 
in illicit activity by supplying him with narcotics . . . the role of the government 
has passed the point of toleration. Moreover, such conduct does not facilitate 
discovery or suppression of ongoing illicit traffic in drugs. It serves no justifying 
social objective. Rather, it puts the law enforcement activities in the position of 
creating new crime for the sake of bringing charges against a person they have 
persuaded to participate in wrongdoing. 
West, 511 F.2d at 1085 (quoted in Kummer, 481 N.W.2d at 437). Additionally, the per se rule 
fulfills another important ambition: it "eliminates any excuse for law enforcement officers or 
agents to possess controlled substances, except during the brief span between the seizure or 
undercover purchase and the placement of the drugs in the police evidence locker, thereby 
facilitating enforcement of anti-corruption measures." Kummer, 481 N.W.2d at 442 (citing R. 
Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 Minn.L.Rev. 163, 191 (1976)). 
Based on the foregoing, under either the traditional case by case standard or the per se 
standard, Beddoes was entrapped into committing the crime of possession of controlled 
substances with intent to distribute. Accordingly, the district court erred in forwarding the 
question of entrapment to the jury and in denying Beddoes motion to dismiss because the 
- 15-
evidence presented by the State did not negate entrapment beyond a reasonable doubt. See State 
v. Kourbelas, 621 P.2d 1238, 1240 (Utah 1980). Cf. State v. Gallegos, 849 P.2d 586, 590 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Beddoes urges this Court to remand the case to the district 
court for sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law. In the alternative, this Court should 
find, as a matter of law, that Beddoes was entrapped into committing the charged offense. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of July, 1994. 
RONALD J. YENGICH 
HAKEEM ISHOLA 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby declare that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Appellant's 
Opening Brief, postage prepaid, this day of July, 1994, to Jan Graham, Utah Attorney 




that "On or about the 13th day of November, 1992, in 
Juab County, State of Utah, the defendant," who is Kim 
Beddoes here today, "unlawfully did commit a third 
degree felony by violating Utah's Controlled Substance 
Act as follows: the defendant did knowingly or 
intentionally possess marijuana, a controlled 
substance, with the intent to distribute, contrary to 
the statutes of the State of Utah." 
And now that's the allegation that's been 
made by the State. And I've already indicated to you 
that the defendant has pled not guilty to that 
allegation, those charges, and that's why we're here 
today to try the issue before the Court. 
MR. EYRE: Thank you, your Honor. 
Counsel, members of the jury, we're at that 
stage of the trial where I have an opportunity to give 
you a brief opening statement as to what the State of 
Utah will attempt to introduce as evidence here today. 
I think most of you know my name is Donald 
Eyre, and I'm the Juab County Attorney. It's my 
obligation to represent the interests of the State of 
Utah in this matter with respect to the prosecution of 
the defendant. 
The defendant Kim Beddoes has been charged 
with the crime of possessing marijuana with the intent 
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God. 
MR. SHEPHERD: Yeah, 
THE COURT: Have a chair right here, 
Mr. Shepherd. 
BY MR. EYRE 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
Q Mr. Shepherd, the jury is the people that 
need to hear you, so speak to them when I ask you 





Ned C. Shepherd. 
And where do you reside? 
In Springville, Utah. 
And where are you employed, Mr. Shepherd? 
A Geneva Steel. 
Q And how long have you been employed there? 
A Twenty years, 
Q Mr. Shepherd, are you acquainted with the 






Yes, I am. 
How long have you known Mr. Beddoes? 
In excess of 20 years. 
And how have you known him? 
As a friend. 
Q And have you come together socially with him 
in the past? 



























Q Gone hunting with him --
A Yes. 
Q — those type of things? Referring you to 
November the 13th of last year, were you within Juab 
County on that date? 
A Yes. 
Q And on that date were you traveling back from 
California? 
A Yes. 








And were you arrested at that time? 
Yes. 
And what were you arrested for? 
Possession of marijuana of in excess of 16 
Q And, in fact, you had 15 pounds; is that 
correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q And at the time of your arrest were you 
interviewed by Bill Tompkins the Juab County Deputy? 
A Yes. 
Q And were you also interviewed by John Ellis 
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1 of the Utah Department of Investigations? 
2 I A Yes. 
3 | Q Mr. Shepherd, in your wallet at the time of 
your arrest did you have a list of names and phone 
5 I numbers? 
6 A Yes, I did. 
7 Q And in that list, was the defendant Kim 
8 Beddoes ' name there and his phone number? 
9 A Yes. 
10 Q After the interview with Officer Tompkins and 
11 Mr. Ellis, did you agree to deliver some marijuana to 
12 Mr. Beddoes? 
13 A Yes, I did. 
14 Q Did you also agree to deliver to some other 
15 people in Utah County? 
16 A Yes. 
17 Q Were the individuals that you agreed to 
18 deliver in Utah County, were their names also on that 
19 list? 
20 A Yes, they was. 
23 Q Prior to going to California to pick up this 
22 marijuana, had you made any -- had any prior contact 
23 with Mr. Beddoes concerning his sharing in that 
24 marijuana? 
25 A T can't remember. Yeah, I think so. 
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Q And he wasn't aware of the date that you were 
going to be there; is that correct? 
A He had no idea. 
Q But had he asked you for a portion of that 
marijuana? 
A No. I think I just told him that I would be 
going. 
Q Okay. When you were stopped by the officers 
and they talked to you about delivering some marijuana 
to Mr. Beddoes, did you make a phone call to him? 
A Yes, T did. 
Q Do you recall approximately what time that 
was that that phone call took place? 
A In the afternoon. 
Q You were stopped in the morning; is that 
correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q And when you called the first time, was Kim 
home? 
A No 
Q So you had to call a second time? 
A Several times. T don't remember how many. 
Q Finally he was home; is that correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q And what did you say to him and what did he 
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1 say back to you at that time? 
2 A He said "Hello." 
3 I said -- I can't remember. I said to stay 
4 there, and -- T think I just said just to stay there. 
5 Q When you had been to Mr. Beddoes' house on 
6 other occasions, had you called him similarly? 
7 A Yeah. 
8 Q Was that a common practice for you to do? 
9 A That's common. 
10 Q So you'd just call to see if he was there? 
11 A Yeah, and to stay there, I'll be there. 
12 Q After you had that phone conversation, did 
13 the officers make arrangements with you how you were 
14 to conduct this transaction? 
15 A That's true. 
16 Q What did they do, the officers? 
17 A They told me to talk about things in the 
18 past. They told me to deliver it to him. They put a 
19 wire -- a listening device on my chest and give me a 
20 pound of marijuana approximately. 
21 Q Did you have a conversation with the officers 
22 concerning what amount they ought to take up there? 
23 A Yes. 
24 Q And whose suggestion was the pound? 
25 A I did. 
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Q And so they provided you with what you 
suggested; is that correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q And they then put a wire so they could listen 
to your conversation; is that correct? 
A That's correct, 
Q And did you then travel to Mr. Beddoes' 
house? 
A Yes. 
Q And what way did you enter? Did you enter 
the front door? 
A No. 
Q How did you enter? 
A He has a garage that has a basement door. I 
pulled up. He met me halfway, I believe, and that's 
how we entered was through the basement door. 
Q Okay. After you had entered his house, how 
did you carry the marijuana? 
A I carried it underneath my coat. It was in a 
paper bag. 
Q In a paper bag? And after you entered the 
house, did you have a conversation with him? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q Who talked first, do you recall? 
A I think I did. 
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Q What did you say? 
A Let's see, "You got the money?" "Have you 
got any money?" or something to that effect. And he 
said, "No." 
Q Then what did you say? 
A And then -- gee, it's hard to remember 
exactly what I said, I handed him the pound. And 
then T told him it would be $1,600 for that pound, 
plus what he owed me. And then I told him the total 
amount. 
Q And this was all being tape recorded; is that 
correct? 
A Yeah, there was a listening device on me. I 
imagine it was taped. 






Did he look into it? 
I don't recall 
And you told him it was going to cost $1,600? 
That's correct. 
Q Did he make any comment to that or try to 
dicker price with you? 
A No. 
Q And after you told him -- commented to him 
that he still owed you some money; is that correct? 
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A Yeah. 
Q And then you told him the total amount that 
he owed you; is that correct? 
A That's correct, 
Q Did you then leave or did you stay for any 
time? 
A No, I turned around and left right then. 
Q Did you observe anyone else in the house at 
that time? 
A No. 
Q After you left, what did you do? 
A I drove down to Main Street here, the main 
road, and met with an officer, and then we went back 
to the jail. 
Q Okay. Later that day did you also complete 
deliveries to other people in Utah County? 
A It was not that day but the next day I 
believe it was. 
Q How many other people? 
A Just one. 
Q And because of your cooperation, did my 
office agree to reduce the charges against you? 
A Yes. 
Q From a third degree felony; is that correct? 
A I'm not sure what all the charges that were 



























Q But to a misdemeanor; is that correct? 
A To a misdemeanor, yes. 
Q You're still — the third degree felony 
charge is still pending; is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q And the Utah County authorities agreed to 
cooperate with respect to charges there; is that 
correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q Mr. Shepherd, did Mr. Beddoes at any time 
balk at taking possession of the marijuana' 
A Not that I remember. 
Q Did you have to argue with him to take it or 
to take it for that price? 
No, 
Q Was the price that you were selling it to him 
for similar to what marijuana was going for in other 
areas? 
A Yes. 
Q It wasn't a low price, was it? 
A No. 
MR. EYRE: You may take the witness. 
THE COURT: Cross-examine, Mr. Carter. 
/// 
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CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. CARTER: 
Q I'm kind of interested, Mr. Shepherd, in your 
statement there was a prior arrangement- between you 
and Mr. Beddoes to purchase some quantity of marijuana 
from this 15 pounds. Is that true or is that not 
true? 
A That — 
Q Well, let's go over this? 
A Okay. 
Q Let's recall your testimony here. Do you 
remember sitting there --
A Sure. 
Q -- before? Do you remember telling us a 
little bit different story last time around? 
A I remember telling you that --
Q Just answer that yes or no, please. 
A Yes, I remember. 
Q You told me a different story last time? 
A No. 
MR. CARTER: I'd ask the Court to publish the 
transcript from the previous hearing. The original 
should be in the file. 
THE COURT: I have it right here, if this is 
the one. 
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1 MR. CARTER: It was one prepared by Vonda. 
2 There's a preliminary hearing transcript as well, but 
3 Vonda prepared the transcript of this hearing. 
4 MR. EYRE: Okay. 
5 Q BY MR. CARTER: Are you ready? I'd ask you 
6 to go with me and look over that. I've got it 
7 highlighted there. Kind of key in on it. If I could 
8 ask you just to pay a little bit of attention to it. 
9 Let me ask you just a few other questions 
10 before we get to that. Have you had any discussions 
11 with the police officers today about your testimony 
12 here today or with Mr. Eyre's office? 
13 A I asked them if I could review what had 
14 happened, and they said no. 
15 Q Do you remember last time you testified did 
16 they give you anything to review? 
17 A Yes. 
18 Q What did they give you to review? 
19 A It was papers of what went on. 
20 Q And do you know who prepared that? 
21 A I'm not sure. The State, I imagine. 
22 Q Someone from the State. It's a document the 
23 State gave to you? 
24 A Mr. Eyre did, yeah. 
25 Q It wasn't a situation anything that you had 


























written up; correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q It was something they had written up; is that 
correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q All right. Now, tell me about this -- as I 
understand it, you pled to a Class B misdemeanor, 
possession of marijuana; correct? 
A That's what they plan on. 
Q That hasn't been done yet? 
A That hasn't been done yet, no. It's still 
pending. 
Q Do you know why it's taking so long? 
A So that I'll testify in this case. 
Q And they're afraid that you might not testify 
or not testify what they perceive to be the truth? 
A Well, yeah. They want me to show up, yeah. 
Q And they want to make sure that they get 
their story from you; is that correct? 
A That's correct, yeah. 
Q And then after this thing is all done with 
Mr. Beddoes, they're going to kick it down to a Class 
B misdemeanor; is that correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q Let's go over this, page 21, line 13. These 


























are questions I asked you. 
A Do you want we to read it? 
Q Let me ask you the questions, and you read 
the answers, so we can replay this as best we can for 
the jury. 
My question to you, "So there was no 
agreement that he would get any portion of this 
marijuana that you were bringing?" 
And your answer at that time was what? 
A It says, "Not really, no." 
Q Question, "Did he, in fact, know that you 
were down in California on this date surrounding 
November 13th?" And your answer? 
A "No." 
Q No one even knew; correct? 
A No one knew, not even my wife. 
Q Let's go to page 40 of the transcript. I 
asked you at that time, "There had been no prior 
arrangements made by him with you to purchase any 
amount of marijuana; correct?" Your answer? 
A "That was correct, yeah." 
MR. EYRE: What page are you referring to? 
MR. CARTER: That was page 40, starts at 
line 6. 
THE WITNESS: That's not exactly what he said 


























when he asked this question -- when Mr. Eyre asked 
this question before. I took it as would he --
Q BY MR. CARTER: The truth is Mr. Beddoes knew 
nothing about you going to California; correct? 
A He knew nothing about me going to California. 
Q The truth is Mr. Beddoes had no prior 
arrangements for you to deliver him any marijuana from 
this 15 pounds; is that correct? 
A That's correct. Nobody talked about it. 
Q No one even knew you went to California. 
A That's correct. 
Q You went to California, and you bought 15 
pounds of marijuana; correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q And who were you going to deliver that 15 
pounds to, do you recall? 
A I was going to deliver it to -- some of it 
was to Mr. Beddoes, but most of it was in Utah County. 
Q And who is in Utah County? 







I would hate to incriminate him 
So he hasn't been charged yet? 
Yes, he has. 
Oh, he has been charged? 
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A Yes. 












Q But the police know who he is? 
A I don't need to drag him through the mud, 
though . 
Q What's his name? 
A We call him Tuna. 
Q What's his formal name? 
A Steve Smith. 
Q All right. Now, Steve Smith is the gentleman 
you brought this marijuana back for; is that not true? 
MR. EYRE: Objection, your Honor. Asked and 
answered. 
THE WITNESS: That's true. 
Q BY MR. CARTER: This list that they get from 
the wallet, what is that list? 
A That's a list I have in my wallet of people 
that I call now and again. 
Q Friends? 
A Yeah. 
Q Employer s? 
A Yes. 
Q Fellow workers? 
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Q And you caught him by surprise; wouldn't you 
say that was true? 
A I would say, yeah, he was surprised by it, at 
the amount. 
Q Who came up with the amount? Was that you? 
A That was me. 
Q You or the police? 
A That was me. The reason why I was --
Q Let me ask the questions, and then that way 
we can control it a lot better. 
A Okay. 
Q And then Mr. Eyre can ask questions if he'd 
like to. 
MR. CARTER: Judge, I'm looking for a 
particular point in the transcript, but I can't find 
it yet, and I don't want to sit here and make the jury 
wait for me to locate that. If I could call 
Mr. Shepherd in a bit, I'd appreciate that. 
THE COURT: Any objection to that? 
MR. EYRE: No. 
THE COURT: Mr. Eyre, redirect? 
MR. EYRE: A few questions. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. EYRE: 
Mr. Shepherd, you've testified that part of 


























Q T apologize for bringing you back 
Mr. Shepherd, but we have some confusion over certain 
statements that were purportedly made to Mr. Beddoes 
by yourself. We've listened to a tape and we've also 
listened to testimony of Mr. Bowles and of Mr. Ellis. 
It's reported that in your conversations with 
Mr. Beddoes that you made comment that you sold to him 
a pound of marijuana previously. Is that true or is 
that not true? 
A That's not true. Whether I said that or not, 
that's not what happened. 11" may have just come out 
the fact that — 
Q Did anybody w H te a script for you to say --
did anybody tell you what to say when you approached 
Mr. Beddoes' residence? 
A Yeah, they did tell me what to say. 
Q But it's not true that you sold Mr. Beddoes a 
pound; correct? 
A No. Previously, no, it's not. 
Q You went into Mr. Beddoes' residence, and you 
had a Fargo unit on; correct? 
A That's correct, yeah. 
Q Have the police played to you a tape of that 
conversation to Mr. Beddoes' residence? 
A Yeah, they played it to me to clarify it. 
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know is because 450 is what I'd charge for a quaiter 
pound. 
Q You'd never sell a pound for $450? 
A I can't buy it for that. 
Q All right. Tell ™e this, what conversations 
did Mr. Tompkins or Mr. Ellis have with you regarding 
entrapment? Did they make any discussions to you 
regarding the issue of entrapment? 
A No. They said what we'd have to do is we 
would put a wire on me. I would approach Mr. Beddoes 
with the amount. I was suppose to talk about a past 
experience, the money that he owed me, and how much, 
and then make sure that I mentioned marijuana in my 
conversation, or pot, or something similar. 
Q In your opinion was Mr. Beddoes entrapped? 
A Yes, I do. I think he was. 
MR. CARTER: Nothing further. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. EYRE: 
Q Mr. Shepherd, Officer Tompkins did have a 
lengthy discussion with you about your past experience 
with Mr. Beddoes; is that correct? 
A That's true. 
Q And he asked you specifically as to what 
amount you would feel comfortable in delivering to 
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Q And he tried to talk you out of that; isn't 
that also true? 
A I don't remember. 
Q He told you he didn't have the money. 
A He didn't have the money, right. 
MR. CARTER: Okay. Nothing further. 
RECROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. EYRE: 
Q But you had fronted him the marJjuana 
previously on the time when he owed you the 450; is 
that correct? 
A Yeah, right. 
Q So that wasn't unusual for you. 
A No, if they didn't have the money, I'd front 
it to them. It's quite expensive. 
MR. EYRE: Nol-hing further. 
FURTHER REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. CARTER: 
Q But you don't typically front it twice. You 
always make sure you capture your funds from the 
previous time; correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q So this would be extremely unusual; correct? 
A That would be so, yeah. 
MR. CARTER: Nothing further. 
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advisement? 
THE COURT: No, I think T'rn ready to rule, 
and I probably should have ruled even earlier. I felt 
like there was sufficient evidence at least to make a 
prima facie case. And I did indicate that minds may 
differ. And rather than impose my feeling about the 
evidence, I was going to leave it up to the jury. So 
I'm going to deny the motion to dismiss on the grounds 
of the entrapment defense. 
MR. CARTER: Based on that, then we would 
request a presentence report. 
THE COURT: I'll refer it to AP£P for a 
presentence report and recommendation. Do you have a 
card that you can give Mr. Beddoes? 
THE CLERK: T have one. Do you have the 
address? 
MR. CARTER; No, I don't. 
THE CLERK: I have one downstairs. 
MR. CARTER: Provo? 
THE CLERK: Yes. Brent Baseman. 
MP. CARTER: Yeah, T do. 
THE COURT: Since I'm not sure when they'll 
get it, do you waive the 30 days? 
MR. CARTER: Yeah. 
MR. EYRE: We could hold it- in Provo for 
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ADDENDUM B 
RULING OF DISTRICT COURT 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KIM BEDDOES and ANNE1TE 
BEDDOES, 
Defendants. 
CASE NO. D-CR-920185 
RULING 
This matter comes before the Court, under Rule 4-501 on Defendants' Motions to 
Dismiss and Motions to Suppress Evidence. The Court has reviewed the file, considered the 
memoranda of counsel, having entertained oral argument, and upon being advised in the 
premises, now makes the following: 
RULING 
1. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the charges against Defendant Annette Beddoes 
is granted. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the arresting officers had probable cause 
to sustain the charges of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute and 
possession of drug paraphernalia. 
2. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on grounds of entrapment of Kim Beddoes is 
denied. The conduct of the arresting officers comported with a fair and honorable 
administration of justice, and did not create a substantial risk that an average person would 
have been induced to commit the crime Defendant Kim Beddoes committed. 
3. Defendants' Motion to Suppress evidence of drug paraphernalia is denied. 
The officer who found the drug paraphernalia, Chief Bowles, was legally on the premises 
pursuant to a valid warrant authorizing the search for drugs and found the drug paraphernalia 
in plain view while searching for those drugs. 
4. Defendants' Motion to Suppress on grounds of illegally concealed recording 
device is denied. The informant upon whom the device was concealed consented to 
recording the conversation with Defendant Kim Beddoes. Since at least one party to the 
recorded conversation consented, no eavesdropping occurred and UCA §76-9-402(l)(a) does 
not apply. 
Dated this Z7day of May, 1993. 
cc: Donald J. Eyre, Jr. 
Shelden Carter 
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Donald J. Eyre Jr., No. 1021 
Juab County Attorney 
125 North Main Street 
Nephi, Utah 84 648 
Telephone: 623-1141 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff, : JUDGMENT, SENTENCE AND 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
vs. : 
Criminal No. 
KIM BEDDOES, : 
Defendant. : 
The defendant, Kim Beddoes, having been found guilty at a jury 
trial on September 27, 1993 of the third degree felony of 
possessing marijuana with the intent to distribute. 
The matter was referred to the Department of Adult Probation 
and Parole for the preparation of a pre-sentence report. 
The defendant and his attorney, Shelden Carter, appeared 
before the Court on November 16, 1993 for the entry of Judgment and 
Sentencing. 
No legal reason having been shown why Judgment should not be 
imposed. It is the Judgment of the Court that the defendant is 
1 
guilty of the third degree felony of possessing marijuana with the 
intent to distribute and is sentenced to serve not more than five 
years in the Utah State Prison and to pay a fine of $1#000.00 and 
a surcharge of $850.00. 
Imposition of the prison sentence is suspended upon successful 
completion of a 36 month probation upon the following terms and 
conditions: 
1. The defendant enter into an agreement with Adult Probation 
and Parole and abide strictly with its terms and conditions. 
2. The defendant to report to the Department and to the Court 
whenever required. 
3. The defendant violate no law either federal, state or 
municipal. 
4. The defendant serve six months in the Juab County jail 
with the privilege of work release. 
5. The defendant pay the $1,000.00 fine and the $850.00 
surcharge, at a reasonable monthly rate set by his probation 
officer. 
6. The defendant not use any illegal drugs and submit 
himself, his vehicle, and his residence to search without the 
necessity of a warrant at the discretion of his probation officer. 
7. The defendant to submit to random drug testing without the 
necessity of a warrant. 
2 
8. After completion of the jail sentence, the defendant is to 
successfully complete an intensive supervision program, when and 
where it* is available. 
9. The defendant is to obtain a drug evaluation and complete 
any drug rehabilitation program as directed by his probation 
officer. 
10. In the event the defendant successfully completes the 
terms of probation, the Court will consider the defendant's motion 
that he be sentenced under the next lower category of offense. 
Dated this 2-1 day of //^^4oU£<^ , 1993. 
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ADDENDUM D 
WILLIAMSON v. UNITED STATES 
_ The United States 
Law Week Supreme Court Opinions 
Jur*2ft, W 4 THE aUftEU) Of NATIONAL AFFAftS, * C WASHINGTON. DX. Voturoa 62. No. 4d 
OPINIONS ANNOUNCED JUNE 27, 1994 
The Supreme Court decided: Full Text of Opinions 
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE--Evident* 
As Bpplied to out-of-court statement implicating both decltr* 
m i end mother, hearsay exception for statements against penal 
interest, Fed.RJEv. 804(b)(3), allows admission of only those 
statements within declarant's narrative that are individually self-
inculpatory end excludes non-self-inculpatory statements even if 
made within broader narrative that is generally self-inculpatory, 
(Williamson v. VS.. No. 93-S2S6) Page 4639 
MASS MEDIA—Cable Television 
Musi-carry provisions of 1992 Cable Television Consumer 
Protection and Competition Act, which require cable television 
systems to devote portion of their channels to transmission of 
local commercial and public broadcast television stations, ere 
content-neutral restrictions on speech that will withstand First 
Amendment scrutiny if, on remand, it is determined that they 
further asserted important governmental interests in preserving 
benefits of free broadcast television, promoting widespread dis-
semination of information from multiplicity of sources, or pro-
moting fair competition in television programming market, and 
that incidental burden on speech is not greater than essential to 
further governmental interests. (Turner Broadcasting System v. 
Ftdcral Communications Commission. No. 93-44) Page 4647 
SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES—Church and State 
New York statute that creates public school district eotermi-
eous with religious enclave in order to provide handicapped 
achool children with public educational services already avail-
able in surrounding community schools to which parents in 
enclave refuse to tend their children neither guarantees that 
ether religious communities will be treated equally nor consti-
tutes sole method for both providing educational services and 
accommodating religious sect's beliefs, and thus violates First 
Amendment's Establishment Clause, (Board of Bducation of 
Kiryas Jot! Villa* School District v. GrumtU No*. 9J-517,93-
327.493-539) Page 4665 
No. 93-4256 
FREDEL WILLIAMSON, PETITIONER v. UNITED 
STATES 
OK WRIT OF CERT10JUJU TO THE UNITED STATES COURT 
OF APPEALS FOB THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
Syllabus 
No. 93-5256. Argued April 26,1994—Decldad June 27,1964 
After Reginald Rams refused to testify at petitioner Williamson* 
federal trial on eeceiii* possession and distribution charges, the 
District Court ruled that, undar Federal Rule of Evidence 
gOsfbXSVs hearaey ekcaption for statement* egelnat penal interaitf 
a Drug Enforcement Admiaiatratlon agent could recount two custo-
dial interview* in which Karris had freely confessed to receiving 
and transporting the drugs in quaetion, but also implicated" Wil* 
iiaraaon as the drugs' owner. Williamson was eventually eonvicted, 
and the Court of Appaals affirmed. 
Held-' The judgment is vacated, and the eaae la ramended. 
061 F. 2d 1262, vacated and remanded. 
Jusncx O'CONNOft delivered the opinion of the Court with 
respect to Parti 1, n-A, and EhB, concluding; 
1. The tnoet faithful reading of Rule S04(bK3)—which renders 
admisiihle "statement!*) which . . . ao far tenldl to euhject the 
declarant to . . . criminal liability . . . that a reasonable person 
, . , would not have made [them) unless believing [then] to be 
true"—u that it does not allow admission of non-eelMnculpatory 
abatements, even if they are mad* within a broader narrative that 
is generally eelf-inculpetory. Although the statutory term "state-
ment" can maan aither an axtended declaration or a single remark, 
the principle behind the Rule, ao far as It is diacarnibla from the 
t«*t, points clearly to the narrower reading, ao that only those 
remark* within a confession that art individually self-inculpatory 
are covered. The Rule U founded on the eomiponaenae notion that 
reasonable people, even those who are not eapaeially henaet, tend 
not to make aeif-inculpatory etetamente unlace they believt them 
to be trua. Tbie notion doe* not attend to a confession's non-eelf-
inculpatory parte—to parts that are actually eelf-eaculpatory, or to 
collateral etoterocnta, tven ones that are neutral aa to interest. A 
district court may not just assume that a etetement Is self-inculpa-
tory because it is part of a fuller confession, especially when the 
Statement implicates someone alee. The poliry eipreieed in the 
Rule's text is clear enough that it outweighs whatever force lies in 
ambiguous statements contained in the Advisory Committal Nate* 
to the Rule. 
2. The foregoing- reeding does not eviscerate the against penal 
internet exception. There are many circumstances in which Kola 
g04(bX3) does allow the admiasSon of statements that inculpate a 
criminal defendant. Even the conieasiena of arrested accomplices 
may be admissible if they are truly eelf-inculpatory, rather than 
merely attempt* to ehiit blame or curry favor. Tbe queeUon under 
NOTE* Waorc a fa deemed desrabk s fytkbiu (acadoeM) eft be iwaeaed 
• • • af UK taut tht oatoea k koicd. Tee r/Uaboi moattaiu* ao pan of ibt 
cpawje of tht Coun but kat bin prvpmd by tW fuporur of D*diW/or the 
CDXTvtak*oi of Ik feeder. See iMltwd $*m*i % Uindt l*mi*r C * . » US. 
J21»SJ7. 
NOTICE: That optaicei arc subject to formal mvkiga bttae pobtioiikn in 
tbe preliminary prbt of u* Tjajtos SHIM Reports. Harden vrx reqstsied ia 
aodfyU* Rcsonar of DBOBOML. Stltra* Court of tbe U&koi Sbta, Waihini-
too, »£» W41, of aay tYMgrmpW or other formal erron. m order last 
amdktti e*y br m*dt before d* pfeiknlnafy prim go* to pnu. 
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th* Rult U always whtthor the stsumant i t time was fufScicnDy 
against Hit doclarant's ptneJ inurui nndtr the Rult'a lanfuagt. 
and thii question can only h% aniwond in iifht of all tha iur-
founding circmnatenetf. 
JUSTICE CCONNOti Jointd by JusTiCI SCALIA, concludad in Part 
77-C that, on remand, tht Court of Appeals roan inquire in tb# 
fint instance whathar oath of the statement* in tUrrii' eenieftilon 
WM truly •elf-inculpatory. ' 
O'COKNOR, J., announced the jwdftnent of the Court end delivered 
the opinion of tht Conn with respect to Parts I, tl-A, and XI-B, in 
which BUCXUUN, STIVINS, SCALM, BOUTM, and GZNSBURO, JJ., 
Joined, arid an opinion with respect to Part f!-C, In which SCALIA, 
«J.,jeined. 8CAUA» J„ aled a oonnurini opinion, OWSBUXO. J., died 
an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the Judgment, in 
which BUCKMUN, STEVENS, and Sours*. JJ„ Joined. KENNEDY, J.t 
filed an opinion concurring in tho judgment, In which REHNQU&T, 
C. J.v and THOMAS, J., joinod. 
JUSTICE O'CONNOft delivered the opinion of the Court, 
except as to Part II-C. 
In this case we clarify the eoope of the hearsay excep-
tion for AtatemenU against penal interest Fed. Rule 
Evid. 804(bX3). 
I 
A deputy aherifff topped the rental car driven by Regi-
nald Harris for weaving on the highway. Harris eon-
eented to a search of the ear, which revealed 19 kilo-
grams of oocaina in two suitcases in the trunk. Harris 
was promptly arrested. 
Shortly after Harris' arrest, Special Agent Donald Wal-
ton of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in* 
terviewed him by telephone. During that conversation, 
Harris said that he got the cocaine from an unidentified 
Cuban in Fort Lauderdale; that the cocaine belonged to 
petitioner Williamson; and that it was to be delivered 
that night to a particular dumpster. Williamson was 
also connected to Harris by physical evidence: The lug-
gage bore the initials of Williamson's sister, Williamson 
was listed as an additional driver on the car rental 
agreement, and an envelop* addressed to Williamson 
and a receipt with Williamson's girlfriend's address were 
found in the glove compartment 
Several hours later, Agent Walton spoke to Harris in 
person. During that interview, Harris said he had 
rented the car a few days earlier and had driven it to 
Fort Lauderdale to meet Williamson. According to Har-
ris, he had gotten the cocaine from a Cuban who was 
Williamson's acquaintance, and the Cuban had put the 
cocaine in the car with a note telling Harris how to 
deliver the drugs. Harris repeated that he had been 
instructed to leave the drugs in a certain dumpster, to 
return to his car, and to leave without waiting for 
anyone to pick up the drugs. 
Agent Walton then took steps to arrange a controlled 
delivery of the cocaine. But as Walton was preparing to 
leave the interview room, Harris 'got out of [his] chair 
. , . and . . . took a half step toward [Walton] . . . and 
. . . said, * . . 1 cant let you do that,' threw his hands 
up and said that's not true, I can't let you go up there 
for no reason/- App. 40. Harris told Walton he had 
lied about the Cuban, the note, and the dumpster. The 
raaJ story, Harri* aaid, was that he wen transporting the 
cocaine to Atlanta for Williamson, and that Williamson 
was traveling in front of him in another rental car. 
Harris added that after his car was stopped, Williamson 
turned around and drove past the location of the stop, 
where he could see Harris* car with its trunk open. 
Jbid. Because Williamson had apparently seen the po-
lice searching the car, Harris explained that it would be 
impossible to make a controlled delivery, IdL, at 41. 
Harris told Walton that he had lied about the source 
of the drugs because he was afraid of Williamson, / d , 
at 61, 68; see also id., at 30-31. Though Harris freely 
implicated himself, he did not want his story to be re-
corded, and he refused to sign a written version of the 
statement. ld.% at 24-25. Walton testified that he had 
promised to report any cooperation by Harris to the 
Assistant United States Attorney. Walton said Harris 
was not promised any reward or other benefit for 
cooperating. Id., at 25-26. 
Williamson was eventually convicted of possessing co-
caine with intent to distribute, conspiring to possess 
cocaine with intent to distribute, and traveling interstate 
to promote the distribution of cocaine, 21 U. S. C. 
§§841(a)(1), 846; 18 U. S, C. §1952. When called to tes-
tify at Williamson's trial, Harris refused, even though 
the prosecution gave him use immunity and the court 
ordered him to testify and eventually held him in con-
tempt. The District Court then ruled thet, under Rule 
B04(bX3), Agent Walton could relate what Harris had 
aaid to him; 
The ruling of the Court is that the statements . . . 
are admissible under [Rule 804(bX3)], which deals 
with statements against interest. 
"First, defendant Harris' statements clearly impli-
cated himself, and therefore, are against his penal 
interest. 
"Second, defendant Harris, the declarant, ia un-
available. 
•And third, as I found yesterday, there are suffi-
cient corroborating circumstances in this case to en-
sure the trustworthiness of his testimony. There-
fore, under [United State* v. Harrtll% 788 F. 2d 1524 
(CA11 1986)], these statements by defendant Harris 
implicating [Williamson] are admissible." App. 
61-52. 
Williamson appealed his conviction, claiming that the 
admission of Harris' statement* violated Rule 804(b)(3) 
and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. 
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed 
without opinion, judgt order reported at 981 F. 2d 1262 
(1992), and we granted certiorari. 610 U. S (1994). 
II 
A 
The hearsay rule, Fed. Rule Evid. 802, is premised on 
the theory that out-of-court statements are subject to 
particular hazards. The declarant might be lying; he 
might have mispercaived the events which he relates; he 
might have faulty memory; hie words might be misun-
derstood or taken out of context by the listener. And 
the weys In which these dangers are minimized for in-
court statements—the oath, the witness' awareness of 
the gravity of the proceedings, the jury's ability to ob-
serve the witness' demeanor, and, most importantly, the 
right of the opponent to cross-examine—art generally 
absent for things said out of court 
Nonethelaaa, the Federal Rules of Evidence also recog-
nize that some kinds of out-of-court statements are less 
subject to these hearsay dangers, and therefore except 
them from the general rule that hearsay is inadmissible. 
One such category covers statements thet are against 
the declarant's interest; 
/statement^] which . . . at the time of [their] mak-
ing . . . ao far tended to subject the declarant to . • * 
criminal liability . . . that a reasonable person in 
the, declarant's position would not have made the 
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etatamentfs] unlets believing [them] to be true." 
Fed. Rule Evid. 804(b)(3). 
lb decide whether Harris1 confession is made admissi-
ble by Rule 804(bX3), we must first determine what the 
Rule means by 'statement,* which Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 801(aXl) defines ae "an oral or written assertion." 
One possible meaning, Ma report or narrative," Webster's 
Third New Internationa] Dictionary 2229, defn. 2(a) 
(1961), connotes an extended declaration. Under this 
reading* Harris' entire confeBsion~»eveo if it contains 
both self-inculpatory and non-self-inculpatory 
parts—would be admissible ao long as in the aggregate 
the confession sufficiently inculpates him. Another 
meaning of "statement," "a single declaration or remark,* 
ibid., defn. 2(b), would make Rule 604(b)(3) cover only 
those declarations or remarks within the confession that 
are individually self-inculpatory. See also id., at 131 
(defining "assertion" as a "declaration"); id., at 886 (de-
fining "declaration" as a "statement"). 
Although the text of the Rule does not directly resolve 
the matter, the principle behind the Rule, so far as it is 
discernible from the text, points clearly to the narrower 
reading. Rule 604(b)(3) is founded on the commonsanse 
notion that reasonable people, even reasonable people 
who are not especially honest, tend not to make self-
inculpatory statements unless they believe them to be 
true. This notion simply does not extend to the broader 
definition of "statement." The fact that a person is mak-
ing a broadly selMnculpatory confession does not make 
more credible the confession's non-eelMneulpatory parts. 
One of the most effective ways to lie is to mix falsehood 
with truth, especially truth that seems particularly per-
suasive because of its self-inculpatory nature. 
In this respect, it is telling that the non-self-inculpatory 
things Harris said in his first statement actually proved 
to be false, as Harris himself admitted during the sec-
ond interrogation. And when part of the confession is 
actually self-exculpatory, the generalization on which 
Rule 804(b)(3) is founded becomes even less applicable. 
Self-exculpatory statements are exactly the ones which 
people are most likely to make even when they are 
false; and mere proximity to other, self-inculpatory, state-
ments does not increase the plausibility of the eelf-
txculpatory statements. 
We therefore cannot agree with JUSTICE KENNEDY'S 
suggestion that the Rule can be read as expressing a 
policy that collateral statements—even onee that are not 
in any way against the declarant's interest—are admissi-
ble, pott, at 6. Nothing in the text of Rule 804(b)(3) or 
the general theory of the hearsay Rules suggests that 
admissibility should turn on whether a statement is 
collateral to a self-inculpatory statement The fact that 
a statement ia self-inculpatory does make it more 
reliable; but the fact that a statement is collateral to a 
aelf-inculpatory statement says nothing at all about the 
collateral statement's reliability. We see no reason why 
collateral statements, even ones that are neutral aa to 
interest, post, at 8-9, ahould be treated any differently 
from other hearsay statements that are generally 
excluded. 
Congress certainly could, avtuect to the constraints of 
the Confrontation Clause, make statements admissible 
baaed on their proximity to aelf-inculpatory statements. 
But we will not lightly assume that the ambiguous lan-
guage means anything ao inconsistent with the Rule's un-
derlying theory. See Cooler A Oell v. Hartmarx Corp.% 
496 U. fi. 384. 394-895, 408-409 (1990). In our view, 
* 1 % * ***** f . U V A . l m*«Jf~~. ~t H . . 1 - AAAf%-\/tk\ J . At---. -•* 
does not allow admission of non-self-inculpatory state-
mente, eves if they are made within e broader narrative 
that is generally self-inculpatory. The district court may 
not just assume for purposes of Rule 804(bX8) that a 
statement is self-inculpatory because it is part of a fuller 
confession, and this is especially true when the state-
ment implicates someone else. "pThe arrest statements 
of a codefendant have traditionally been viewed with 
special suspicion. Due to his strong motivation to im-
plicate the defendant and to exonerate himself, a code* 
fendant'e statements about what the defendant said or 
did are less credible than ordinary hearsay evidence." 
Lee v. Illinois, 476 U. 8. 530, 641 (1986) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted); see also Bruton v. Vniud States, 
S91 U. S. 123, 136 (1968); Dutton v. JEfenns, 400 U. B. 
74, 98 (1970) (Harlan, J.f concurring in result). 
JUSTICE KENNEDY suggests that the Advisory Commit* 
tee Notes to Rule 804(b)(3) should be read as endorsing 
the position we reject-that an entire narrative, includ-
ing non-self»inculpatory parts (but excluding the clearly 
self-serving parts, post, at 11). may be admissible if it is 
in the aggregate self-inculpatory. &ee post, at 4-5. The 
Notes read, in relevant part: 
"(T]he third-party confession . . . may include 
statements implicating (the accused], and under the 
genera] theory of declarations against interest they 
would be admissible as related etatements. . . . 
[Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U. 8. 415 (1965), and 
Bruton v. Vnited States, 891 U. S. 123 (1968)] . . . 
by no means require that all statements implicating 
another person be excluded from the category of de-
clarations against interest, Whether a statement is 
in fact against interest must be determined from 
the circumstances of each caae. ThUB a statement 
admitting guilt and implicating another person, 
made while in custody, may well be motivated by a 
desire to curry favor with the authorities and hence 
fail to qualify as against interest. • . . On the other 
hand, the same words spoken under different cireunv 
stances, e.g.t to an acquaintance, would have no dif-
ficulty in qualifying. < . . The balancing of self-
serving against disaenting [sic] aspects of a declara-
tion is diecueeed in McCormick §256,* 28 U. 8. C. 
App., p. 790. 
This language, however, is not particularly clear, and 
aome of it^—especially the Advisory Committee's endorse-
ment of the position taken by Dean McCormick'* tree-
tiee—points the other way: 
"A certain latitude as to contextual statements, neu-
tral aa to interest, giving meaning to the declaration 
againtt interest seems defensible, but bringing in 
self-serving statements contextuaMy aeems question-
able. . * • [Aldmitfting] the disserving parte of the 
declaration, and exc)ud[ing] the self-serving parte 
. . . eeema the moat realistic method of adjusting 
admiesibility to trustworthiness, where the serving 
and disserving parts can be eevered." See C. Mc-
Cormick, Law of Evidence §256, pp. 551-553 (1954) 
(footnotes omitted). 
Without deciding exactly how much weight to give the 
Notes in this particular situation, compare Schiavone v. 
Fortune, 477 U. S. 21, 81 (1986) (Notes are to be given 
aome weight), with Oreen v Bock Laundry Machine Co., 
490 U. 8. 504, 528 (1989) (SCALXA, J., concurring in 
judgment) (Notes ought to be given no weight), we con-
clude that the policy expressed in the statutory text 
62 LW 4642 The United Statu LAW WEEK 6 - 2 8 - 9 4 
whatever force the Notes may have. And though JUS-
TICE KENNEDY believes that the text can fairly be read 
aa expressing a policy of admitting collateral statements, 
pott, at 6, for the reasons given above we disagree. 
B 
We also do not share JUSTICE KENNEDY'S fears that 
our reading of the Rule *eviecerate[e] the against penal 
interest exception,* post, at 7 (internal quotation marks 
omitted), or makes it lack "meaningful effect," post, at 6. 
There are many circumstances in which Rule 804(b)(3) 
does allow the admission of statements that inculpate a 
criminal defendant. Even the confessions of arrested 
accomplices may be admissible if they are truly self* 
inculpatory, rather than merely attempts to shift blame 
or curry favor. 
For instance, a declarant's squarely self-inculpatory 
eonfesaiotv~"yeal I killed X"—will likely be admissible 
under Rule 804(b)(3) against accomplices of his who are 
being tried under a coconspirator liability theory. See 
Pinkerton v. United States. 828 U. S. 640. 847 (1946). 
Likewise, by showing that the declarant knew some-
thing, a self-inculpatory statement can in some situ-
ations help the jury infer that his confederates knew it 
aa well. And when seen with other evidence, an ac-
complice's self-inculpatory statement can inculpate the 
defendant directly: "I was robbing the bank on Friday 
morning," coupled with someone's testimony that the 
declarant and the defendant drove off together Friday 
morning, is evidence that the defendant also partici-
pated in the robbery. 
Moreover, whether a statement is self-inculpatory or 
not can only be determined by viewing it in context. 
Even statements that are on their face neutral may ac-
tually be against the declarants interest. "I hid the 
gun in Joe's apartment" may not be a confession of a 
crime; but if it is likely to help the police find the 
murder weapon, then it is certainly self-inculpatory. 
-Sam and 1 went to Joe's home" might be against the 
declarant's Interest if a reasonable person in the decla-
rant's shoes would realize that being linked to Joe and 
Sam would implicate the declarant in Joe and Sam's 
conspiracy. And other statements that give the police 
significant details about the crime may also, depend-
ing on the situation, be against the declarant's inter-
est. The question under Rule 804(b)(3) is always 
whether the statement was sufficiently against the dec-
larant's, penal interest "that a reasonable person in 
the declarant's position would not have made the state-
ment unless believing it to be true," and this question 
a n only be answered in light of all the surrounding 
circumstances.* 
C 
In this ease, however, we cannot conclude that all that 
Harris said was properly admitted. Some of Harris' 
confession would clearly have been admissible under 
Rule 804(bX3); for instance, when he said he knew 
there was cocaine in the suitcase, he essentially for-
feited hie only possible defenie to a charge of cocaine 
possession, lack of knowledge. But other parts of his 
confession, especially the parts that implicated William-
son, did little to subject Harris himself to criminal 
•Of taunt, aa eetompHeo'a statsmsnti may also ha admlsaibl* un-
der ethsr pitrviaioieS of Rule* SO 1-604. For butanes, •taumtnts 
sssde in fartfcorenee of tha tsiuplreey may bo admieiibl* nndar Rule 
$01(dX2XE), and other statements chat boar ciKumiUntial fuaran-
tsea of trustworthy** msy bt aimiasiblt unasf RuJf $04(bX5>, th* 
liability. A reaaonable person in Harris' position might 
even think that implicating someone else would decrease 
his practical exposure to criminal liability, at least so 
far as sentencing goes. Small fish in a big conspiracy 
often get shorter sentences than people who are running 
the whole show, see, t.g.% United States Sentencing 
Commission, Guidelines Manual §3B1.2 (Nov. 1993), 
especially if the small fish ere willing to help the au-
thorities catch the big ones, see, e.g., id., at §5K1.1. 
Nothing in the record shows that the District Court or 
the Court of Appeals inquired whether each of the state-
ments in Harris1 confession was truly self-inculpatory. 
As we explained above, this can be a fact-intensive 
inquiry, which would require careful examination of all 
the circumstances surrounding the criminal activity 
involved; we therefore remand to the Court of Appeals 
to conduct this inquiry in the first instance. 
In light of this disposition, we need not address Wil-
liamson's claim that that the statements were also made 
inadmissible by the Confrontation Clause, see generally 
White v. Illinois, 502 U. S, (1992), and in particular 
we need not decide whether the hearsay exception for 
declarations against interest is "firmly rooted" for Con-
frontation Clause purposes. Compare, e.g., United 
States v. Seeley, 892 F. 2d 1, 2 (CAl 1989) (holding that 
the exception is firmly rooted), with United States v. 
Floret, 985 F. 2d 770 (CAS 1993) (holding the contrary). 
We note, however, that the very fact that a statement is 
genuinely self-inculpatory—which our reading of Rule 
804(bX3) requires—is itself one of the "particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness'* that makes a statement 
admissible under the Confrontation Clause. See Lee v. 
Illinois, 476 U. S. 530, 543-545 (1986). We also need 
not decide whether, as some Courts of Appeals have 
held, the second sentence of Rule 804(b)(3)—"A state-
ment tending to expose the declarant to criminal liabil-
ity and offered to exculpate the accused is not admis-
sible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate 
the trustworthiness of the statement" (emphaais 
added>—also requires that statements inculpating the ac-
cused be supported by corroborating circumstances. See, 
e.g., United Statu v. Alvarez, 684 F. 2d 694, 701 (CA5 
1978); United States v. Taggart. 944 F. 2d 637, 840 
(CA11 1991). The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
vacated, and th* case is remanded for {unbar proceed-
ings consistent with this opinion. 
So ordered. 
JUSTICE SCAIiA, concurring. 
I join the Court's opinion, which I do not understand 
to require the simplistic view of statements against 
penal interest that JUSTICE KENNEDY attributes to it. 
Whan analyzing whether evidence can be admitted 
under the atatement-against-penal-interest exception to 
the hearsay rules, the relevant inquiry must always be, 
as the text directs, whether the statement "at the time 
of its making • . . ao far tended to subject the declarant 
to . . . criminal liability . . . that a reaaonable person in 
the declarant's position would not have made the 
statement unless believing it to be true.* Fed. Rule 
Evid, 804(b)(3). I quite agree with the Court that a 
reading of the term "statement11 to connote an extended 
declaration (and which would thereby allow both self-
inculpatory and non-self-inculpatory pans of a declara-
tion to be admitted ao long as the declaration in the 
aggregate was sufficiently inculpatory) is uneupportable, 
See ante, at 4-5. 
Employing the narrower definition of "statement," BO 
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that Rule 804(b)(3) allows admission of only those 
remarks that are individually self-inculpatory, does not, 
as JUSTICE KENNEDY states, "eviscerate the against 
penal interest exception." Post, at 7 (internal quotations 
and citation omitted). A atiitement obviously can be 
self-inculpatory (in the sense of having so much of a 
tendency to subject one to criminal liability that a 
reasonable person would not make it without believing 
it to be true) without consisting of the confession "1 
committed X element of crime Y." Consider, for exam-
ple, a declarant who stated: "On Friday morning, I went 
into a gunshop and (lawfully) bought a particular type 
of handgun and particular type of ammunition. I then 
drove in my 1958 blue Edsel and parked in front of the 
First City Bank with the keys in the ignition and the 
driver's door ajar. I tben went inside, robbed the bank 
and shot the security guard** Although the declarant 
has not confessed to any element of a crime in the first 
two sentences, those statements in context are obviously 
against his penal interest, and I have no doubt that a 
trial judge could properly admit them. 
Moreover, a declarant's statement 1$ not magically 
transformed from a statement against penal interest into 
one that is inadmissible merely because the declarant 
names another person or implicates a possible co-
defendant. For example, if a lieutenant in an organized 
crime operation described the inner workings of an 
extortion and protection racket, naming some of the 
other actors and thereby inculpating himself on racke-
teering and/or conspiracy charges, I have no doubt that 
some of those remarks could be admitted as statements 
against penal interest. Of course, naming another 
person, if done, for example, in a context where the 
declarant is minimising culpability or criminal exposure, 
can bear on whether the statement meets the Rule 
804(bX8) standard. The relevant inquiry, however-^and 
one that is not furthered by clouding the waters with 
manufactured categories such as 'collateral neutral" and 
•collateral eelf-aerving," eee, e.g., post, at 3, 9—must 
always be whether the particular remark at issue (and 
not the extended narrative) meets the standard set forth 
in the Rule, 
JUSTICE GjNsmmo, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUK. 
JUSTICE STEVENS, and JUSTICE SOUTER join, concurring 
in part and concurring in the judgment 
I join Parts I, II-A, and II-B of the Courta opinion. 
I agree with the Court that Federal Rule of Evidence 
604(bX3) except* from the general rule that hearsay 
statements are inadmissible only "those declarations or 
remarks within [a narrative] that are individually self-
inculpatory." Ante, at 5. As the Court explains, the 
exception for statements against penal interest "does not 
allow admission of non-selMnculpatory statements, even 
If they are made within a broader narrative that is 
generally aelf-inculpatory,* <wta, at 6; the exception 
applies only to statements that are 'sufficiently against 
the declarant's penal interest that a reasonable person 
in the declarant's position would not have made the 
statement unless believing it to be true." Ante, at 9, 
quoting Fed. Rule Evid. 804(bX3). 
Further, the Court recognises the untrustworthineee of 
Statements implicating another person. Ante, at 6. A 
person arrested in incriminating circumstances has a 
strong incentive to shift blame or downplay his own role 
in comparison with that of others, in hopes of receiving 
* shorter sentence and leniency in exchange for coopera-
tion. For this reason, hearsay accounts of a suspect's 
Statements implicating another person have been held 
inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause. See Lee 
v. IlUnoiB, 476 U. S. 530, 541 (1986) ("when one person 
accuses another of a crime under circumstances in which 
the declarant stands to gain by inculpating another, the 
accusation is presumptively suspect and must be 
subjected to the scrutiny of crosa-examination"); ibid. 
("TT]he arrest statements of a co-defendant hsve tradi-
tionally been viewed with special suspicion. Due to his 
strong motivation to implicate the defendant and to 
exonerate himself, a co-defendant's statements about 
what the defendant said or did are less credible than 
ordinary hearsay evidence/-) (quoting Bmton v. United 
States. 891 U. S. 123, 141 (1968) (White, J., dissenting)). 
" Unlike JUSTICE O'CONNOK, however, I conclude that 
Reginald Harria* statements, as recounted by DEA 
Special Agent Donald E. Walton, do not fit, even in pari, 
within the exception described in Rule 804(b)(3), for 
Harris*.arguably inculpatory statements are too closely 
intertwined with his self-serving declarations to be 
ranked as trustworthy Harris was caught red-handed 
with 19 kilos of cocaine—enough to subject even a first-
time offender to a minimum of 12Vt years' imprisonment. 
8ee United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines 
Manual §2Dl.l(c) (1993); id.% ch. 5, pt A (sentencing 
table). He could have denied knowing the drugs were in 
the car> trunk, but that strategy would have brought 
little prospect of thwarting a criminal prosecution. He 
therefore admitted involvement, but did so in a way that 
minimised his own role and shifted blame to petitioner 
Fredel Williamson (and a Cuban man named Shawn). 
Most of Harris1 statements to DEA Agent Walton 
focused on Williamson's, rather than Harris*, conduct. 
Agent Walton testified to the following: During a brief 
telephone conversation shortly after he was apprehended, 
Harris said he had obtained 19 kilos of cocaine for 
Williamson from a Cuban man in Fort Lauderdale, 
Florida; he stated that the cocaine belonged to William-
son, and was to be delivered to a dumpster in the 
Atlanta area that evening. App* 37. Harris repeated 
this story to Agent Walton when the two spoke in 
person later in the day. Harris also said that he had 
rented the car a few days earlier and had included 
Williamson's name on the rental contract because 
Williamson was going to be in the Fort iauderdale area 
with him, ld.} at 38-39. After Agent Walton aought to 
arrange a controlled delivery, Harris retracted the story 
about the dumpster, saying it was false. 
Harris* second account differed as to collateral details, 
but he continued to paint Williamson as the "big fish." 
Harris reported that be was transporting the cocaine to 
Atlanta for Williamson. When the police stopped Harris' 
car, Williamaon was driving in front of him in another 
rented car. After Harria waa stopped, Williamaon 
turned around and pulled over to the aide of the road; 
from that vantage point, he obaerved the police officer 
inspecting the contents of Harris' trunk. # . , at 40-41. 
And, Harris repeated, "the arrangements for the acquisi-
tion and the transportation had been made by Mr. 
Williamson." # . , at 41. 
7b the extent some of these statements tended to 
incriminate Harris, they provided only marginal or 
cumulative evidence of his guilt They project an image 
of a parson acting not against his penal interest, but 
striving mightily to shift principal responsibility to 
someone else. See United States v. SarmitntO'Perett 633 
F. 2d 1092, 1102 (CAS 1981) ("[The declarant] might 
well have been motivated to misrepresent the role of 
others in the criminal enterprise, and might well have 
62 LW 4644 The VnU*d Statei LAW WEEK O-Ztf-W 
viewed the atatement[e] at a whole—including the 
ostensibly disserving portion*—to be in hie interest 
rather than against it."). 
For these reasons, I would hold that none of Harris* 
hearsay statements were admissible under Rule 
B04(bX3).* The trial Judge characterized Agent 
Walton's testimony as ''very damning.* App. 50. The 
prosecutor considered it so prejudicial that she offered to 
join defense counsel's motion for a mistrial should the 
trial court determine that the heareay statements had 
been erroneously admitted. ld.% at 51 (I f the [trial] 
Court determines that it has been improper for [Agent 
Walton] to aay those statements, then the Court must of 
necessity declare a mistrial, because there it no way 
they can remove what . . . they have heard that 
Reginald Harris said about Predel Williamson, end the 
Government will join in the [defensa counsel's) motion 
(for e mistrial}* because I think that would be a burden 
no one could overcome in the 11th Circuit."). I concur 
In the Court's decision to vacate the Court of Appeale* 
judgment, however, because I have not examined the 
entire trial court record; I therefore cannot say the 
Government should be denied an opportunity to argue 
that the erroneous admission of the hearsay statements, 
in light of the other evidence introduced at trial, 
constituted harmless error See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 
52(a); Xotte<iko$ v. Vnittd Statei, 328 U. 8. 750, 776 
(1946) (error requires reversal of criminal conviction if 
it is "highly probable that the error had substantial and 
injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's 
verdict"). 
JUSTICE KENNEDY, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and 
JUSTICE THOMAS join, concurring in the judgment. 
I 
Federal Rule of Evidence 802 states the general rule 
that hearsay evidence is Inadmissible in federal court 
proceedings, but there are numerous exceptions. At 
issue here is the exception contained in Rule 604(b)(3), 
which allows admission of 
"[a] statement which was at the time of ita making 
so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or 
proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the 
declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render 
invalid a claim by the declarant against another, 
that a reasonable person in the declarant's position 
would not have made the statement unlese believing 
it to be true. A statement tending to expose the 
declarant to criminal liability and offered to excul-
pate the accused is not admiaiible unleee corroborat-
ing circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthi-
ness of the statement/ 
The rationale of the hearsay exception for statements 
against interest is that people seldom "make statements 
which are damaging to themselves unless eatisfied for 
•Nor aeuld an? ef Herri*' b»er»ey eUUment* be admitted uad*r 
Rut* e0M4X9M&). vhieh provide* that eteteroenti made *by a 
eocoiuplrator of a party during the court* and la nuthtrence of the 
censpir&e/ are ix* heexeey The trial judf* laitielly *pp4*r*d ta 
feast hit ruling admitting the ttatemenU on the co-coaeaireter nil*. 
See App. 14-96; id>, at 47 (1 let It in M e to<on*pir*tor »uu 
merit*). Tht proaecatot, however, "agreeCd] with {daftnee eouW] 
totally* that Ithey are] not . . . statements in furtherance at th* 
eenipiraey"; Agent WeJton'a Uttimony, sh« explained, was "not 
affered ttader (the eo-eompirater] axeeption," but under Rule 
§04(bKB). App Al. I do not n*d the Court1! opinion, **U, At S, 
n. \ to eogfeft that the hetn«y eteteroenti in thi$ out could K*T« 
been edfaitted under Rule SOKdXWE). 
good reason that they are true." Advisory Committee 
Notes on Fed. Rule Cvid. 864, 2d U. S. C. App., p, 789. 
Of course, the declarant may make his statement 
against interaat (such as "I shot the bank taller*) 
together with collateral but related declarations (such as 
"John Doe drove the getaway car*). The admissibility of 
those collateral statements under Rule 804(bXB) is the 
issue we must decide here. 
There has been a long-running debate among commen-
tators over the admissibility of collateral atatemente. 
Dean Wigmore took the strongest position in favor of 
admissibility, arguing that "the statement may be 
accepted not merely as to the apecific fact against 
interest, but also as to every fact contained in the same 
statement* 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence (1466, p. 271 (3d 
ed. 1940) (emphasis deleted); see aleo 5 J. Wigmore, 
Evidance {1465, p. 339 (J. Chadbourne rev. 1974); 
Higham v. Ridgway, 10 East 109, 103 Eng- Rep. 717 
(K. B< 1808). According to Wigmore, becauee "the 
statement is made under circumstances fairly indicating 
the declarant'e sincerity and accuracy," the entire 
statement should be admitted. 5 J. Wigmore J1485, p. 
271 (3d ad. 1940). Dean McConnfck'e approach regard-
ing collateral atatemente was more guarded. He argued 
for the admissibility of collateral atatemente of a neutral 
character; and for the exclusion of collateral statements 
of a self-serving character. For example, in the state* 
ment "John and I robbed the bank." the words "John 
and" are neutral (aave for the possibility of conspiracy 
charges). On the other hand, the statement "John, not 
I, shot the bank teller" is to some extent self-serving 
and therefore might be inadmissible. Sea C. McCormick, 
Law of Evidence §256, pp. 552-553 (1954) (hereinafter 
McCormick). Professor Jefferson took the narrowest 
approach, arguing that the reliability of a statement 
against interest stems only from the disserving fact 
stated and so should be confined "to the proof of the fact 
which ia against interest." Jefferson, Declarations 
Against Interest: An Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 58 
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 62-63 (1944). Under the Jefferson 
approach, neither collateral neutral nor collateral self-
aerving statements would be admissible. 
Enacted by Congress in 1976, Rule 604(bX3) estab-
lishes a hearsay exception for statement* against penal, 
proprietary, pecuniary, and legal interest (end does not 
distinguish among those interests). The text of the Rule 
does not tell us whether collateral statements are 
admissible, however. See antt, at 5; see also Comment, 
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) and Inculpatory 
Statement* Against Penal Interest, 66 Calif. L. Rev. 
1189, 1202 (1978) ("The text of Rule 804(b)(3) by ittelf 
provides little guidance and would accommodate comfort-
ably either a doctrine excluding or one admitting 
collateral statements"). The Court resolves the issue, as 
I understand its opinion, by adopting the extreme 
position that no collateral statements are admissible 
under Rule 804(bX3). 8ee oak, at 5 (adopting "narrower 
reading" that -Rule 804(b)(8) coverts] only those declara-
t ion or remarks within the confession that are individu-
ally self*inculpatory"); ant*, at 1 (OINSBURG. J„ concur-
ring in part and concurring in judgment); but cf, cnU, 
at 1-2 (SCAUA, J., concurring). The Court reaches that 
conclusion by relying on the "principle behind the Rule" 
that reasonable people do not make atatemente against 
their interest unless they are telling the truth, ante* at 
6» and raasona that this policy "expressed in the statu-
tory text," &nut at 8, "eiinply does not extend" to 
collateral atatemente. Ante, at 6. Though conceding 
that Congress can "make atatemente admissible baaed on 
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their proximity to eelf-inculpatory etatements,* the Court 
eays that it cannot "lightly assume that the ambiguous 
language meant anything ao inconsietent with the Rule's 
underlying theory." Ante, at 6. 
With raipect, I must disagree with this analysis. All 
agree that the justification for admission or hearsay 
•tatements against interest was, as it still is. that 
reasonable people do not make those statements unless 
believing them to be true, but that has not resolved the 
long-running debate over the admissibility of collateral 
•tatements, as to which there is no clear consensus in 
the authorities. Indeed, to the extent the authorities 
come close to any consensus, they support admission of 
some collateral statements. See supra, at 2-3, Given 
that the underlying principle for the hearsay exception 
has not resolved the debate over collateral statements 
one way or the other, I submit that we should not 
assume that the text of Rule 804(bX3). which is silent 
about collateral statements, in fact incorporates one of 
the competing positions. The Rule's silence no more 
incorporates Jefferson's position respecting collateral 
•tatements than it does McCormiek's or Wigmore's. 
n 
Because the text of Rule 604(b)(3) expresses no 
position regarding the admissibility of collateral state-
ment*, we must determine whether there are other 
authoritative guides on the question, tn my view, three 
sources demonstrate that Rule 804(b)(3) allows the 
admission of some collateral statements: the Advisory 
Committee Note, the common law of the hearsay 
exception for atatemente against interest, and the 
general presumption that Congress does not enact 
statutes that have almost no effect. 
First, the Advisory Committee Note establishes that 
aome collateral statements are admissible. In fact, it 
refers in specific terms to the issue we here confront: 
*lo]rdinarily the third-party confession is thought of in 
terms of exculpating the accused, but this is by no 
means always or necessarily the case: it may include 
etatements implicating him, and under the general 
theory of declarations against interest they would be 
admissible as related etatements* 28 U. 8. C. App., p. 
790. This language eeems a forthright statement that 
collateral statements are admissible under Rule 
804(bX8), but the Court reasons that the policy ex-
preaeed in the statutory text points clearly enough in 
one direction that it outweighs whatever force the Notes 
may have." Ante, at 8. Again, however, that reasoning 
begs the question: What is the policy expressed in the 
text on the admissibility of collateral atatemente? Aa 
stated above, the text of the Rule does not answer the 
question whether collateral atatemente are admissible. 
When as here the text of a Rule of Evidence does not 
answer a question that must be answered in order to 
apply the Rule, and when the Advisory Committee Note 
does answer the question, our practice indicates that we 
ahould pay attention to the Advisory Committee Note. 
We have referred often to those Notes in interpreting 
the Rules of Evidence, and I eee no reason to jettison 
that well-eatabliahed practice here. See Huddleeton v. 
VniUd State*, 4B5 U. 8. 681, 688 (1988); United State* 
v. Owen*, 484 U. 6. 554, 562 (1988); Bourjaily v. United 
State*. 488 U. 8. 171, 179, n. 2 (1987); United State* v. 
Abel, 489 U. 8. 4B, 61 (1984). 
Second, even if the Advisory Committee Note ware 
ailent about collateral atatemente, I would not adopt a 
rule excluding ail atatemente collateral or related to the 
indications, we can presume that Congress intended the 
principles and terms used in the Federal RUISB of 
Evidence to be applied as they were at common law 
See Daubert v. Merrell Vow Pharmaceutical Inc., 509 
U. S. ^ i (1993) (slip op., at 7); Green v. Bock 
Laundry Machine Co., 490 U. 8. 504, 621-522 (1989); 
United State* v. Abel, eupra, at 61-52; see also 
Midlantic Nat Bank v. New Jereey Dept. of Environ* 
mental Protection, 474 U. 8. 494, 601 (1986) {"if Con-
gress intends for legislation to change the interpretation 
of a judicially created concept, it makes thet intent 
specific*). Application of that interpretive principle 
indicates that collateral statements should be admissible. 
"From the very beginning of this exception, it has been 
held that a declaration against interest is admissible, 
not only to prove the dissarving fact stated, but also to 
prove other facta contained in collateral statements 
connected with the disserving statement1* Jefferson, 58 
Harv. L. Rev., at 67; eee alec McCormick {256; 5 J. 
Wigmore, Evidence §1465 (3d ed< 1940). Indeed, the 
Advisory Committee Note itaelf, in stating that collateral 
atatemente would be admissible, referred to the "general 
theory" that related etatements are admissible, an 
indication of the state of the law at the time the Rule 
was enacted. Rule 804(bX3) does not address the issue, 
but Congress legislated against the common law back-
ground allowing admission of some collateral statements, 
end I would not assume that Congress gave the common 
law rule a ailent burial in Rule 8Q4(bX9)< 
There is yet a third reason weighing against the 
Court's interpretation, one specific to statements against 
penal interest that inculpate the accused. There is no 
dispute that the text of Rule 804(bX3) contemplates the 
admission of those particular statements. Absent a 
textual direction to the contrary, therefore, we should 
assume that Congress intended the penal interest 
exception for inculpatory etatements to have some 
meaningful effect. See American Paper Institute, Inc. v. 
American Electric Power Service Corp.t 461 U- S. 402, 
421 (1983) (court should not "imputfe] to Congress e 
purpose to paralyze with one hand what it eought to 
promote with the other*) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). That counsels against adopting a rule exclud-
ing collateral statements. As commentators have 
recognised, 'the exclusion of collateral statement* would 
cause the exclusion of almost all inculpatory state-
ments.* Comment, 66 Calif. L. Rev., at 1207; eee also 
Note, Inculpatory Statements Against Penal Interest and 
the Confrontation Clause, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 159, 163 
(1988) ("most atatamente inculpating a defendant are 
only collateral to the portion of the declarants statement 
that is against his own penal interest The portion of 
the statement that specifically implicates the defendant 
is rarely directly counter to the declarant's penal 
interest") (footnote omitted); Davenport, The Confronta-
tion Clause and the Co-Conspirator Exception in Crimi-
nal Prosecutions: A Functional Anelyaie, 85 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1876. 1396 (1972) ("the naming of another as a 
compatriot win almost never be against the declarant's 
own interest*). Indeed, as one commentator indicated, 
the conclusion that no collateral statements are admissi-
ble—the conclusion reached by the Court today—would 
"eviscerate the against penal interest exception.* 
Comment, 66 Calif. L. Rev., at 1218. 
lb be sure, under the approach adopted by the Court, 
there are aome situations where the Rule would still 
apply. For example, if the declarant said that he stole 
certain goods, the statement could be admitted in a 
62 LW 4646 Ths United Stat** LAW WEEK 6-28-94 
order to thaw that the goods were Btolen. See 4 J. 
Weinstein A M. Berger, Welnstein's Evidence 
§804(bX3)[04J, p. 804-164 (1993); tee also ante, at 8-9. 
But as the commentators have reeogniwd, it U likely to 
be the rare ease where the precise self-inculpatory words 
of the declarant, without more, also inculpate the 
defendant. I would not presume that Congress intended 
the penal interest exception to the Rule to have eo little 
effect with reepect to itatemenU that inculpate the 
accused. 
I note finally that the Court's decision applies to 
statements againBt penal interest that exculpate the 
accused as well as to those that inculpate the accused. 
Thus, if the declarant said* "I robbed the store alone," 
only the portion of the statement in which the declarant 
said "I robbed the store" could be introduced by a 
criminal defendant on trial for the robbery. See Not*, 
Declarations Against Penal Interest: Standards of 
Admissibility Under an Emerging Majority Rule, 66 
B. U. L. Rev. 148, 165. n. 96 (1976). That seems 
extraordinary. The Court gives no justification for such 
a rule and no explanation that Congress intended the 
exception for exculpatory statements to have this limited 
affect. See id.% at 166 ("A strict application of a rule 
excluding all collateral statements can lead to the 
arbitrary rejection of valuable evidence"). 
in 
Though I would conclude that Rule 804(b)(3) allows 
admission of statements collateral to the precise words 
against interest, that conclusion of course does not 
aniwer the remaining question whether all collateral 
statement* related to the statement against interest are 
admissible; and if not, what limiting principles should 
apply The Advisory Committee Note euggests that not 
all collateral statements are admissible. The Note 
refers, for example, to McCormick's treatise, not to 
Wigmor-a'e, for guidance as to the "balancing of self* 
serving against disfserving] aspects of a declaration." 28 
U, S. C. App„ p- 790. As noted iupro, at 2, Wigmore's 
approach would allow the admission of "every feet 
contained in the same statement," but McCormick's 
approach is not eo expansive. McCormick stated that 
"(a] certain latitude as to contextual (i.e., collateral] 
statements, neutral as to interest, giving meaning to the 
declaration against interest eeems defensible, but 
bringing in self-serving statements contextually seems 
questionable." McCormick $256, p. 662. McCormick 
further stated that, within a declaration containing self-
serving and disserving facts, he would "admit the 
disserving parts of the declaration, and exclude the self-
serving parts" at least "where the serving and disserving 
parts can be severed." Id. §266, p. 653. It thus appears 
that the Advisory Committee Note, by its reference to 
(and apparent incorporation of) McCormick, contemplates 
exclusion of a collateral self-serving statement, but 
admission of a collateral neutral statement. 
In the criminal context, a self-serving statement is one 
that tends to reduce the charges or mitigate the punish-
ment for which the declarant might be liable. See M. 
Graham. Federal Practice and Procedure §6795, p. 810, 
n. 10 (1992). For example, if two masked gunmen 
robbed a bank and one of them shot and killed the bank 
teller, a statement by one robber that the other robber 
was the triggerman may be the kind of self-serving 
statement that should be inadmissible. See ibid. 
(collateral self-serving statement is "John used the gun"). 
(The Government concedes that such a statement may 
t» inadmissible. See Brief for United States 12.) By 
contrast, when two or more people are capable of 
committing a crime and the declarant simply names the 
involved parties, that statement often is considered 
neutral, not self-serving. See Graham, Mupra, at 810, n. 
10 ("the statement 'John and I robbed the bank' is 
collateral neutral"); Note, 66 B. U. L. Rev., at 166, n. 96 
("An examination of the decisions reveals that, with very 
few exceptions, collateral Cecta offered as part of a 
declaration against penal interest are neutral rather 
than self-serving"); I N generally Uniud State* v. York, 
933 F. 2d 1343, 1362-1364 (CA7 1991); Uniud State$ v. 
Cosamotto, 887 F. 2d 1141, 1171 (CA2 1989). 
Apart from that limit on the admission of collateral, 
eelf'serving statements, there is a separate limit applica-
ble to cases in which the declarant made his statement 
to authorities; this limit applies not only to collateral 
statements but also to the precise words against penal 
interest. A declarant may believe that a statement of 
guilt to authorities is in his interest to some extent, for 
example as a way to obtain more lenient treatment, or 
simply to clear his conscience. The Note takes account 
of that potentiality and states that courts should exam-
ine the circumstances of the statement to determine 
whether the statement was "motivated by a desire to 
curry favor with the authorities." 28 U. 8. C App., p. 
790. That appears consistent with McCormick's recogni-
tion that "even though a declaration may be against 
interest in one respect, if it appears that the declarant 
had some other motive whether of self-interest or 
otherwise, which was likely to lead him to misrepresent 
the facts, the declaration will be excluded." McCormick 
§256, p. 553. 
Of course, because the declarant is by definition 
unavailable, see Fed. Rule Evid. 804(a), and therefore 
cannot he questioned to determine the exact motivation 
for his statement, courts have been forced to devise 
categories to determine when this concern is sufficient 
to justify exclusion of a statement as unreliable. It has 
been held, for example, that a statement to authorities 
admitting guilt, made after an explicit promise of 
dropped charges or of a reduction in prison time in 
exchange for the admission of guilt, may be so unreli-
able as to be inadmissible. See, e.g., Uniud State* v. 
Ma&ana*Oli>era, 917 F. 2d 401, 407-409 (CA9 1990); 
Uniud Statu v. Scopo, 861 F. 2d 839, 348 (CA2 198B) 
("If . . . a pleading defendant had an agreement with 
the government or with the court that he would not be 
punished for the crimes to which he allocuted, then that 
allocution would not subject him to criminal liability and 
would not constitute a statement against his penal 
interest"). At the other extreme, when there was no 
promise of leniency by the government and the declarant 
was told that he had a right to remain ailent and that 
any statements he made could be used against him, the 
courts have not required exclusion of the declarant's 
statement against interest. See id, at 346-349; United 
StaU$ v. Garcia. 897 F. 2d 1413, 1421 (CA7 1990) 
(declarant not motivated by desire to curry favor; 
"voluntarily made his statement after being advised of 
his Miranda rights and did not enter into any plea 
agreements with the government"). This kind of line-
drawing is appropriate and necessary, lest the limiting 
principle regarding the declarant's possible desire to 
obtain leniency lead to the exclusion of all statement* 
against penal interest made to police, a result the Rule 
and Note do not contemplate. 
Id sum, I would adhere to the following approach with 
respect to statements against penal interest that 
inculpate the accuaed. A court first should determine 
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whether the declarant made a atatement that contained 
a fact against penal intareat See anU% at 10 (opinion 
of O'CONNOR, J.) ('Some of Harris' confession would 
clearly have been admissible under Rule 804(bX8)*). If 
so, the court should admit all statements related to the 
precise atatement against penal interest, subject to two 
limits. Consistent with the Advisory Committee Note, 
the court should exclude a collateral atatement that i6 
eo aelf-serving as to render it unreliable (if, for example, 
it shifts blame to aomeone else for a crime the defen-
dant could have committed). In addition, in cases where 
the atatement was made under circumstances where it 
is likely that the declarant had a significant motivation 
to obtain favorable treatment, as when the government 
made an explicit offer of leniency in exchange for the 
declarant** admission of guilt, the entire atatement 
should be inadmissible. 
A ruling on the admiisibility of evidence under Rule 
804(bX3) I* * preliminary question to be determined by 
the District Judge under Rule 104(a). That determina-
tion of necessity calls for an inquiry that depends to a 
Urge extent on the circumstance* of a particular case. 
For this reason, application of the general principles 
here outlined to a particular narrative atatement often 
will require a difficult, factbound determination. District 
Judges, who are close to the facta and far better able to 
evaluate the various circumstances than an appellate 
court, therefore must be given wide discretion to exam-
ine a particular atatement to determine whether all or 
part of it ehould be admitted. Like the Court, then, I 
would remand this ease, but for application of the 
analysis set forth in this opinion. 
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No. 05-44 
TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC., ET AL., 
APPELLANTS u. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS 
COMMISSION ET AL. 
ON APPEAL PROM THE UNTTED 8TATE8 DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OP COLUMBIA 
Syllabus 
No. **~44. Argued January 22.19M—D#ckUd June 27.1894 
Concerned that a eeenpatitive imbalance between cable television sad 
ev*r~th**air broadeaatera wu endangering the broadcasters' abflity 
to compete for s viewing audience and thai for necessary operat-
ing revaatiat, Congress passed the Cehla Television Consumer 
Protection and Competition Act of 1992. ficetlens 4 and o of the 
Act require sabls television systems to devote a specified portion 
ef their channalt to ths transmission of local commercial and 
broadcast stations. Boon altar the Act baeami law, appel-
numerous sabls programmere snd optrstors, challenged the 
eonetitutJonality of tbe must-tarry provisions- Tbe District Court 
granted the United States and inurf#rmr-d«f«uUnu summary 
Judgment, ruling thai the provisions art consistent with the Plrst 
Amendment TO* taint rejected appellants* argument that ths 
provisions warrant strict scrutiny as a eontent-beead raeulation 
and sustained thorn under ths Intermediate standard of scrutiny 
eat forth in Vniui Statu w OHri*\ 191 U. 8. 1*7, concluding 
that they are eulttcisntly tailored te seres ths Important govsrn-
saonta) Intorest la ths preservation of Iocs) broadcasting. 
aWeV TVs Judgment is •seated, and ths ease Is remanded. 
e i i P. Jtopp. I2» vacated and roraandod. 
JUetlCI XaNNimr dolxvorod tha opinion ef the Court with re> 
•pact is Parts L D. and m-A, concluding thai the appropriate 
standard by which to evaluate the constitutlonaHty of the mutt-
tarry provision* ii ths intermediate Itvsl of scrutiny applicable to 
content-neutral rastrictions thst impose an incidental burden on 
speech. 
(a) Becauae the must-carry provisions impose special obliga-
tions upon cable opsrstors and special burdens upon cable pro-
grammers, heightened Plrst Amendment scrutiny it demanded. 
The Itts rigorous standard of scrutiny now roicrvtd for broadcast 
regulation, sot Rtd Lion Broadcasting Op. v, FCC, 895 U. S. 367, 
should not bo extended to cable regulation, tince the rttionelt for 
such review—-the dual problems of spectrum scsrciiy and tignel 
interference—<doea not spply in the context of cable. Nor ii the 
mere sssenion of dyafunetien or failure in the cable market, 
without more, sufficient to shield s speech resulttion from the 
Pirtt Amendment standarde applicable to nanhroedctet media. 
Moreover, while enforcement of s generally applicable lsw agtintt 
members of the preia msy sometime* warrant only rational bail! 
scrutiny, lawe that single out the prett for special treatment pott 
a particular danger of abuse by the State snd are always subject 
to some degree of heightened ecruUny. 
(b) The must'csrry rules are content-neutral, and thus art not 
subject to strict scrutiny. They arc neutral on their face because 
they dlstlngulah between speakers in the television programming 
market bassd only upon the murmur in which pngrsmmsn tana* 
mit their message! to viewert, not the moitsget they carry. Tbe 
purpoeoi underlying the must-carry rules are also unrelated to 
content. Congrats* overriding objective wai not to favor program* 
ming of s particular content, but rather to preserve ecieta to free 
television programming for the 40 percent of American! without 
table. The challenged provision^ design snd operation confirm this 
purpote. Congress' acknowledgement thst broadestt television 
station* make s valuable contribution to the Nation's communica-
tions structure dosi not indicate thst Congrats regarded broadcast 
programming te he more valuable than cable programming; rather, 
h reflects on)y the recognition thst the services provided by broad-
cast television have some Intrinsic value and are worth preserving 
against the threats posed by cable. It is also incorrect to suggest 
thst CongTesi enacted must-carry In an effort to exercise eonunt 
control over what subscribera view on cable television, given the 
minimal extent to which the Federal Communication! Commliaion 
and Congrest influence the programming offered by broadcast 
station*. 
(c) None of appellants' additional arguments sufllcee to re-
quire strict scrutiny in this ease. The provitlons do not intrude on 
the editorial control of cable operators. They are content-neutral 
in application, and they do not forte cable opera ton to alter their 
own message! to respond to the broadcast programming they must 
carry. In addition, the physical connection between the televition 
set and the cable network gives cable operators bottleneck, or 
gatekeeper, control over most programming delivered into sub-
scribers' hornet. Miami Hsmld Publishing Co. v. Ibrnillo, 4 IS 
V. 6. 241, and Pacific Cos et EUctric Co. v. Public Vtilitm 
Common cfCal.t 475 U. 8. 1, distinguished. Btriet scrutiny is alto 
not triggered by Congrats1 preference for broadcasters over cable 
opera tort, since it is hased not on the content of the programming 
each group offers, but on the belief thst broadcast television it in 
economic peril. Nor is such scrutiny warranted by the fact that 
the provisions single out certain members of the prats—here, cable 
operators—for disfavored treatment Such differential treatment 
is justified by ths special characteristics of the table medium— 
namely, the sable operators' bottleneck monopoly and ths dsngers 
this power poest to the viability of broadcast te)evision~and 
because tha must-carry provisions are not structured in s msnner 
that earrtee the inherent riak of undermining Plrst Amendment 
interests, Arioasas Wriun' Projecl, /ac v. Magland, 481 U. S. 
221, and Ht*nsapt>ti* Star 6 TWow Co. v. Je/iaaesolo Ccmm'r of 
JUixrua, 460 U. 8. ft?*, distinguished. * 
(d) Under O'Briga, a oontent-neutra) regulation will be tut-
seined if it furthers an important governmental Interact thst it 
unrelated te ths luppraeeion of free expression and tha incidental 
restriction en alleged Pint Amendment freedoms it no greater 
than Ut essential to the furtherance of thst Inttrett. Viewed in the 
abstract, each of ths governmental interests asserted—preserving 
the benefits of fret, ovsr.the-air local broadcast statlont, promoting 
the widespread dissemination of information from s multiplicity of 
aourcas, and promoting fair competition la the market for televj. 
aion programming—is important. 
JUSTICE Kimtxtrr, joined by Txt CHWT JUSTICE, JUSTICE 
BLACXUUN, and Jutnct 8ouTEa, concluded in Pan X2J-B that the 
fact thst the asserted Interests are important in the abstract does 
not msan that ths must-carry proviaiont will in fact advance those 
